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Posner: The Strangest Attack Yet on Law and Economics

THE STRANGEST ATTACK YET ON LAW AND
ECONOMICS
Honorable Richard A. Posner*
Judge Posner responds in this Article to Professor Jaffee. He
first addresses Professor Jaffee's attempt to refute Law and Economics within its own terms by reference to the concept of efficient
breach of contract. Judge Posner argues that even ifsome of Professor Jaffee's criticisms are true-which he doubts-the "efficient
breach" concept and the damages remedies that it implies still
provide the preferred approach to breach of contract problems. He
points out that specific performance-Professor Jaffee's preferred
remedy for breach-raisesproblems of its own, including bilateral
monopoly and a need for continuedjudicialsupervision of contracts.
Regarding the alternative vision offered in Professor Jaffee's
Article-which Judge Posner describes as "vegeto-anarchism "-Judge Posner argues that Professor Jaffee's vision is fatally flawed, a "politics of nostalgia" that fails to account for the
many negative aspects of the simple cultures that Professor Jaffee
offers as exemplar.

The potency of the Law and Economics movement is shown by
its capacity to infuriate-to madden, perhaps literally-its opponents.
Certainly it has inspired some strange critiques.' But none stranger
than Professor Jaffee's. Upon first looking into it, I doubted whether
it was addressed to the rational intellect at all. I thought it was either
a spoof or the product of a deranged mind. But a closer reading has
caused me to revise my estimate and to say of Jaffee's ravings what
Claudius said of Hamlet's: "what he spake, though it lack'd form a

* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School. This is a comment on Leonard R. Jaffee's article, The Troubles with
Law & Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 777 (1992).
1. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, As Gregor Samsa Awoke One Morning from Uneasy
Dreams He Found Himself Transformed into an Economic Analyst of Law, 83 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1012 (1989).
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little, / Was not like madness."2
Jaffee's paper is in two parts, each as long as a normal article.
The first is an attack on economic analysis of contract law. The style,
syncopated and idiosyncratic, reminded me of Karl Llewellyn (founder
of the Dr. Seuss school of legal stylistics). Here is a typical sentence:
"We need not learned theory, discipline in law, but sense and feeling,
feeling's sense."3 The footnotes, in which Jaffee attacks Alan
Schwartz and other economic analysts of contract law, are hypertrophic even by law review standards; are so long, in fact, as to make
the paper seem parodic. Still, the first part of the paper recognizably
belongs to the genre of Law and Economics scholarship. The second
part (parts two through four in Jaffee's notation, but I shall treat it as
a single part) is ostensibly a dialogue between two ostensibly fictional
characters, "Anachronis" and "Moderno"; actually it is a monologue
by Anachronis, whom Jaffee describes as his "near alter ego."
Anachronis is an anarcho-vegetarian. His rhapsodic, incantatory defense or, better, celebration, of this unusual ethico-political stance is
mingled with recollections of a checkered career that includes brutal
parents, an unhappy childhood, running away from home, foster parents, dropping out of college, four wives, an abandoned career in
music, and a variety of curious jobs, including farming in Switzerland
and training horses in Pennsylvania, before law school in his late
thirties. How far Anachronis's career resembles that of Professor
Jaffee I have no idea.
As I have already indicated, on first looking into this farrago of
elephantine footnotes, diatribes against allopathic medicine, fictional or
maybe not so fictional reminiscences, and grandiose posturings, I was
at a loss to find the rational thread. However, a second look revealed
a pattern. Part one is an attempt to demolish Law and Economics
within its own terms-that is, to show that on its own assumptions
it's nonsense. The deck having thus been cleared, part two presents
an alternative vision, that of anarcho-vegetarianism viewed as the
alternative to capitalism (capitalism being, to Jaffee, the philosophy of
gluttony and greed), which Law and Economics epitomizes, and to
socialism, for which Jaffee has no use either since it assigns a big
role to government. The alternative vision is not so much argued for
as narrated; for part two is in the form of a Bildungsroman in which,

2.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARF, HAmET, ACT III, SCENE L

3. Leonard R. Jaffee, The Troubles with Law & Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 777,
781 (1992) (Preface, explaining the article's form and style).
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after many false starts, including three failed marriages, our peaceloving lentil-eater finds fulfillment in gardening, baking bread, crying
in movies, and driving a Saab turbo.
Part one is built around a hypothetical case.4 A supplier of a
component part (I'll call him S) has a contract to supply the part to
manufacturer 1. Manufacturer 2 offers S more for the part, and S
cannot supply both manufacturers, so he breaks his contract with
manufacturer 1 and sells to 2 instead. This is an example of what the
Law and Economics literature calls an "efficient breach." With manufacturer 2 willing to pay more for the part than 1, S can pay manufacturer l's damages in full, yet still come out ahead, so S and manufacturer 2 are better off and manufacturer 1 is no worse off. The
breach is therefore a Pareto improvement over compliance with the
contract, so, according to the Law and Economics buffs, the courts
should not do anything to discourage such breaches, as by imposing
punitive damages (even though the breach is, in a sense, "willful") or
by ordering specific performance of the contract.5
Jaffee argues that the situation may be more complicated than
this. (1) Maybe the cost of the breach to manufacturer 1 is greater
than the gain from the breach to 2 but the damages rules will not
make S pay the full cost, because he lacks notice of l's greater injury (the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale).6 (2) Maybe manufacturer 2 is
offering a higher price for the part not because it's worth more to
him but because he is a less skillful bargainer than manufacturer .'
(3) Maybe some of the costs of- the breach fall on third parties (such
as l's employees, their families, and even their pets).' (4) Manufacturers might become demoralized if suppliers could break their contracts with them.9 (5) Retribution is a source of psychological satisfaction and hence of utility, so punishing even an efficient breach
might be, on balance, efficient.',
All these are possibilities, all right, but they do not show that
"efficient breach" is an empty set. (2) is a trivial concern; firms that

4. Id. at 785.
5. For the flavor of the economic approach to breach of contract, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, ch. 4 (4th ed. 1992).
6. Jaffee, supra note 3, at 786-88, 793 n.11, 786-87, 794-98, 802-03, 804 n.20, 81415, 819 n.24 and related text, 819-21, 821 n.25, 833 n.27 and related text, 840 n.29.
7. Id. at 786.
8. Id. at Part I, §§ C, D, E, 804 n.20, 824-25, 827-35, 833 n.27.
9. E.g., id at 785-88, 791-98, 831-33.
10. E.g., id at 788-95, 819-33, 870-71, 873, 908.
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overpay for their inputs shrink and disappear. (1), to the extent that it
is any problem now that consequential damages are more easily recoverable than in the heyday of Hadley v. Baxendale,1 1 can be taken
care of in advance by express negotiation over the point with the
supplier or by inclusion of a liquidated-damages clause.12 (3) can
also be taken care of in advance by contracts between manufacturer 1
and his employees. If there are genuine third-party effects, there is a
case both in law and in economics for specific performance; so also
in (1) if manufacturer l's remedy in damages is demonstrably inadequate. (4) and (5) are fanciful, especially where the manufacturer is a
corporation.
Jaffee would like specific performance to be the rule and damages the exception, rather than the reverse as in our system; and he is
right to point out that in a frictionless world, which he supposes to
be the world of Law and Economics, specific performance or, for that
matter, capital punishment of willful breaches, would never frustrate
an efficient breach. When manufacturer 2 approached S, S, terrified
of the consequences of a breach, would just refer him to manufacturer
1 and the two manufacturers would decide between themselves who
should get the part. In the real world, however, this solution runs into
the problem of bilateral monopoly. Suppose that manufacturer 1 can
take the part or leave it, but that it is essential to 2's business. Nevertheless, when 2 approaches 1, this may be a tipoff that 2 is desperate, so 1 may hold out for a high price and 2 use all his wiles to
chivvy it down-and the result will be high transaction costs and a
possible breakdown in bargaining. And 2 may need the part more
than 1 yet be the less skillful bargainer, and the costs to 2's employees, etc., if 2 doesn't get the part may exceed the costs to l's employees, etc., if 1 doesn't get the part. Furthermore, since it is out of
the question to order specific performance when the breach of contract is involuntary (even a court can't command the impossible and
expect its command to be obeyed), a norm of specific performance
would imply an inquiry in every case into the character of the breach,
and that inquiry would be a further source of costs. Finally, in many
cases specific performance would entail continuing judicial supervision

11. Western Indus., Inc. v. Newcor Canada Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1203-04 (7th Cir.
1984).
12. The literature expresses some concern that the customer may be reluctant to disclose
his dependence on the supplier's performance, because that might induce the supplier to
charge a higher price. This ignores competition in the supplier's market, which will prevent
him from exploiting the customer's vulnerability.
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of the contractual relationship, and judicial time is scarce.
There is more to part one of Jaffee's paper, though how much
more I'm not sure because the combination of the weird style and the
submersion of text by footnotes defeated my efforts at full comprehension. Still, insofar as I can understand part one, I don't think that
Jaffee has succeeded in showing that the concept of efficient breach
and the remedial implications of the concept are incoherent or selfcontradictory. But I think I understand why he so dislikes the concept
and is therefore eager to dispatch it. He thinks that it sanctifies the
breaking of promises out of greed-specifically S's greed, but possibly also manufacturer 2's. S made a promise and he should keep it
even if he could make more money by breaking it. This ignores,
however, the plight of manufacturer 2. We should ask why he is
willing to pay more for the part than manufacturer 1. The reason may
be (as I have already suggested) that he will have to close down
without it. Why blame S for helping him out of his plight merely
because S's motives are self-interested?
I do not think that Jaffee has dealt a death blow to Law and
Economics, but if he had I would wonder how this paved the way
for vegeto-anarchism. The connection seems to be that Law and Economics is (in his view) a hopeless way of trying to come to terms
with human greed, and his way is better. Although I am not an agricultural expert, I imagine that Jaffee is right in suggesting that if the
human race turned vegetarian, then after the inevitable transitional
dislocations, the cost of feeding the race would be lower than it is
today; perhaps medical costs would be lower too. But I don't see
why there would be less greed. The cost of many things is lower
than it once was-the cost of transportation, for example, or of communications, or of illumination, or of listening to music-without the
greed index having declined as a consequence. If the cost of one
good or service (or class of goods or services) goes down, that frees
up resources to buy other goods and services. For that matter, the
fraction of the family budget that goes for food is much lower today
than it was a century ago even though we are, most of us, still
omnivors-and still greedy. There is a moral argument for vegetarianism, based on the capacity of animals to suffer,13 but I do not
understand Jaffee to be pressing that argument in this paper. He does
suggest that eating meat makes people vicious and warlike, but does

13. JAMES RACHELS, CREATED FROM ANIMALS: THE MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF DARWINISM 211-12 (1990).
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not consider the counterexample presented by vegetarian Hitler.
Maybe I am laying too much stress on the vegetarian plank in
Jaffee's platform. There is more. I mentioned his hostility to allopathic medicine, and that he likes to make his own food. It comes as no
surprise that he is a pacifist. He won't even kill mice or roaches.
"Eventually you get to feel toward bugs and mice as you might toward baby goats or little sheep."' 4 He praises the American Indians
and the poor of China a great deal. He thinks that finance did bad
things to the character of the German Jew. He is, as one could predict, very much down on television, fast food, food preservatives,
unfertilized eggs, vitamin supplements, white bread, and bottle-feeding. He is, in fact, down on the West, viewed as the symbol of progress, modernity, and their handmaiden, technology. He wants us to
adapt to our environment rather than (through everything from air
conditioning to cloning) change the environment to make it suit our
wants better (at the same time multiplying them)-the latter being the
Western way. He is even critical of the wheel and would surely reject
Marlowe's dictum (in The First Part of Tamburlaine the Great), great
Renaissance commonplace though it is, that "Nature . . . Doth teach
us all to have aspiring minds."' 5 Jaffee says, "Look not to Europe's
heritage, but to Hunzas, traditional Georgians, Peru's Andean Indians,
simple folk. They do not want because they don't deand China's
16
mand."
The usual complaint about the politics of nostalgia is that it
overlooks the bad features of the good old days-polio, the Inquisition, the Pale of Settlement, the slave trade, the Black Death, the
exclusion of blacks and women from many occupations. The list is
endless. Jaffee seeks to finesse this complaint by pushing his Golden
Age way back: not to the 1950s, not to the nineteenth century, not to
Cathay or Byzantium or the Roman Republic, but to-the Stone Age.
(Even Heidegger didn't want to go back much before Socrates.) I
may lack imagination, but I do not feel that I would be happier or
more fulfilled living in the Stone Age. I know it sounds crass, but I
would rather read a book than sharpen a flint.
I am not, however, disposed to argue the point with Jaffee. I
don't think it is a subject for argument. I could tease him about the

14. Jaffee, supra note 3, at 907.
15. CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE, TAMBURLAINE THE GREAT, PARTS I & H 41 (John D.
Jump ed., University of Nebraska Press 1967).
16. Jaffee, supra note 3, at 912.
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Saab, but he could answer that it is difficult to live a Stone Age life
in the modem world; one must make compromises. The idea of dealing with scarcity by limiting our wants has a distinguished pedigree
that goes back to Epicurus. So Jaffee is in some good company, but
it is pertinent to note that he has no suggestions for how to get from
where we are back to the Stone Age. I doubt that he would endorse
General Curtis LeMay's method. Stone Age people required a lot of
space. For better or worse, there are now five billion people on Earth.
Their happiness depends on modem technology, the division of labor,
the existence of governments-and the science of economics.
Orwell remarked that Dickens's weakness as a reformer was that
he looked to a change in the human spirit rather than to a change in
institutions for solutions to the social problems that his novels exposed.17 Jaffee, too, looks to change in the human spirit to make life
worth living. He wants people, turned off Law and Economics and,
more broadly, capitalism, by the first part of his paper, to be inspired
by the second part to change their lives. Stop eating meat. 18 Stop
being vaccinated."' Stop eating fast foods.2" Stop watching television.2 Some of his recommendations, such as the one about vaccination, are dangerous. Others are cranky (fast food in moderation
never hurt anyone-and it does save time, as does bottle-feeding).
Some may have considerable merit; he may be quite right that Western doctors are insufficiently receptive to Eastern techniques for treating pain and orthopedic disorders-though I don't think that those
techniques were invented in the Stone Age. At the very end of the
paper, Jaffee suggests that a nonconfrontational style is more effective
in most negotiations.22 I couldn't agree more.
Even Jaffee's entire set of prescriptions, eccentric as the complete system seems, may have been an effective course of therapy for
the unhappy narrator of part two, and perhaps it would be for others
as well, though I suspect that Jaffee's rhapsodic and orotund tone
when he is speaking prescriptively, as in the following hymn to
motherhood, may not be the most effective vehicle for persuading the
readership of the Hofstra Law Review to join him in his trek back to

17.
ORWELL
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Charles Dickens, in 1 COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERs OF GEORGE
413 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds., 1968).
See, e.g., Jaffee, supra note 3, at 886-90, 893-900, 893 n.42, 895 n.44.
See iL at 909 n.51, 910; see also id at 875 n.40, 894 n.43, 895 n.44.
See id at 895 n.44, 911-14; see also id. at 868-75.
See id at 853-76.
Id. at 924-32, 930 n.66.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 3
940

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vo!. 20:933

the Stone Age: "A man of that time [the Stone Age], a man full in
himself, who rejoices in the wealth of his imagination and the work
of his flesh-that man will worship his woman, never see her
slave."' I myself am left cold by the substance, as well as the style,
of this passage, as I am by most of Jaffee's paper. It reminds me
more of Jack Kerouac and Khalil Gibran than, as Jaffee invites us to
compare him to, Kierkegaard and the authors of the Ehagavad Gita.
The lack may be in me. But I am reasonably confident that, pending
the transformation of the human spirit to which Jaffee summons us,
we shall need the tools of economics to guide law in improving the
life of our people.

23.

Jd4 at 882.
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